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Abstract:  The empirical support for the SCM is mixed. We review recent results from our own 
lab and others supporting a central claim of SCM that mirroring occurs at multiple levels of 
representation.  By contrast, the model is silent as to why human infants are capable of showing 
imitative behaviours mediated by a mirror system.  This limitation is a problem with formal 
models that address neither the neural correlates nor the behavioural evidence directly.   
 
Hurley’s SCM is an ambitious attempt to systematize a large body of recent research.  
One key prediction is that mirroring should occur at multiple grains, or levels of representation in 
the motor hierarchy.  Recent results from our own lab as well as others confirm this prediction.  
Several studies have shown that mirroring is dependent on the presence of the observed action in 
one’s own motor repertoire (e.g., Calvo-Merino et al., 2005).  We recently used this finding to 
examine the level of abstraction at which mirroring occurs, and whether this can be manipulated 
by instructions (Longo, Kosobud, & Bertenthal, in press).  We used a paradigm developed 
previously (Bertenthal, Longo, & Kosobud, 2006) in which participants observe a video image of 
a hand at rest with fingers spread apart.  The hand is shown from the perspective of someone else 
facing the participant who responds by pressing a button with the  right index finger if the 
stimulus finger appearing farther to the left moves, and with the right middle finger if the finger 
father to the right moves.  With a left hand as the image, the stimulus and response finger match 
anatomically (e.g., index finger response to an index finger movement); with a right hand, the 
stimulus and response fingers differ anatomically (e.g., index finger response to a middle finger 
movement).  Responses are faster when there is an anatomical match between the stimulus and 
response fingers than when there is not, reflecting mirroring, or automatic imitation, of the 
perceived finger movements. 
 We used this paradigm to investigate the representational level of abstraction at which 
mirroring occurs by presenting images of a computer-generated model of a hand, the joints of 
which could be configured flexibly, allowing us to present finger actions which were either 
biomechanically possible or impossible.  Importantly, the impossible actions were impossible 
only in terms of the manner in which they were performed (i.e., the joints bent in impossible 
ways), but were perfectly possible in terms of what was performed (i.e., tapping a surface).  
Thus, these actions are impossible at one level of the motor hierarchy (i.e., movements), but 
possible at a higher level (i.e., goals).   
In a first experiment in which no mention was made of different types of movements, 
comparable automatic imitation of possible and impossible actions was observed, though 
participants generally were aware of the difference between the stimuli.  This suggests that 
mirroring involves a common representation at the level of goals.  In a second experiment, in 
contrast, in which attention was explicitly drawn to the manner in which the actions were 
performed by mentioning the two types of movements during instructions, automatic imitation 
was completely eliminated for the impossible, but not possible, movements.  This latter result 
suggests that actions were being coded at the level of movements.  Together, these results 
demonstrate that mirroring can occur at more than one level of the motor hierarchy, either in 
terms of goals or in terms of movements, what Rizzolatti et al. (2002) referred to a high- and 
low-level resonance, respectively. 
 Similar relations between mirroring and motor ability as described above have also been 
observed in young infants (e.g., Longo & Bertenthal, 2006; Sommerville, Woodward, & 
Needham, 2005).  These developmental findings are also relevant to our evaluation of the SCM 
model because Hurley acknowledges evidence of mirroring by human infants, but her model 
remains agnostic as to its origins and prerequisites.  By contrast, we contend that the evidence 
reveals that mirroring or imitation is present from birth, but limited to actions already available 
to infants. 
We (Longo & Bertenthal, 2006), for example, used the Piagetian A-not-B error to 
examine mirroring in 9-month-old infants.  This error reflects the tendency of infants at this age 
to perseverate in searching to a location where they have previously found a hidden object (A), 
even after having seen it hidden at a new location (B).  We found that infants “perseverated” in 
reaching to the A location, even when they had merely observed an experimenter retrieve the 
object there, but had not reached themselves.  Furthermore, infants were significantly more likely 
to perseverate when the experimenter had reached ipsilaterally (without crossing the body 
midline), than when they had reached contralaterally (across the midline).  This pattern reflects 
the difficulty infants of this age show in performing contralateral reaches, what Bruner (1969) 
referred to as the “mysterious midline barrier”, and demonstrates that mirroring in infants – as in 
adults – is systematically related to motor skill level.  While our results show an effect of action 
observation on motor performance, the flip side of mirroring is reported by Sommerville and 
colleagues (2005) who show that manipulating infants’ ability to perform actions alters their 
perception of those actions when performed by another agent. 
 While such results show that mirroring mechanisms are operative quite early in human 
ontogeny, strong inferences regarding the origins of such abilities must come from studies of 
younger infants still.  In this light, the numerous experiments demonstrating imitation of facial 
and manual gestures by human neonates are key, suggesting that the neural circuits necessary for 
mirroring are present at birth.   Indeed, given the reported lack of imitation in adult chimpanzees 
and monkeys, the finding of neonatal imitation in neonates of both species (e.g., Myowa-
Yamakoshi, Tomonaga, Tanaka, & Matsuzawa, 2004; and Ferrari et al., 2005, respectively) is 
especially striking.  Such neonatal imitation disappears over the first few months of life in all 
three species, suggesting that rather than reflecting a precocial social-communicative ability, 
overt mimicry represents an inability to inhibit automatic priming of motor representations.  This 
pattern highlights the fact that at least some forms of imitation are not abilities reflecting long-
term learning over time, but are rather automatic tendencies which must be inhibited in order to 
interact effectively with the environment. 
Thus, there is a clear developmental progression of inhibitory control over mirroring 
responses.  While neonates show overt automatic imitation, reflecting very weak inhibitory 
control, older infants do not compulsively imitate, but are biased in their overt search behavior 
by previously observed action.  Mirroring in adults is more implicit still, generally manifesting 
itself in priming of motor responses, rather than their overt imitation (though overt imitation has 
been reported when attention is diverted [e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Stengel, 1947]).  This 
pattern suggests that much of the development  of mirroring responses reflects changes in 
inhibitory control, rather than changes in mirroring representations, per se. 
In conclusion, the model proposed by Hurley is in the tradition of competence vs. 
performance models.  The difficulty with such a model is that it provides a mere skeletal 
structure that has to be fleshed out be details.  Until some critical mass of details has been 
provided, the validity and usefulness of this model will remain an issue. 
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